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Abstract 
The IEC standards 61508/61511 need to be defined and verified by the reliability targets or 
safety integrity targets for safety instrumented functions (SIF). The reliability targets or safety 
integrity targets are categorised as four safety integrity level (SIL). There are many design 
requirements for each SIL level, including requirements of the average probability of failure 
on demand (PFDavg) (Abrahamsen and W. Roed, 2010). The main objective of this master 
thesis was to deal with reliability of several subsea equipments in order to verify SIL level by 
taking uncertainty into consideration. In line with main purpose of these thesis two different 
approaches of SIL verification of several subsea equipments was to demonstrate according to 
the IEC standards 61508. The verification of the SIL requirements for the PFDavg is based on a 
quantitative analysis. The two approaches of SIL verification are known as the traditional 
approach and a new approach by Abrahamsen. The traditional approach is the approach where 
we can calculate PFDavg directly and then compared with the criteria for different SIL level 
which is shown in figure 1. However, this approach cannot be considered as an adequately 
good basis for decision makers to verify SIL, only by focusing on the assigned probability of 
failure on demand.  There is a need for immense requirements of SIL verification according to 
the assigned probability number that can be covered through a new approach proposed by 
Abrahamsen. The key aspect of new approach is related to the uncertainty. There will be more 
discussion related to those two approaches on the later part of my thesis.  
The main difference between the two approaches can easily be referred as to which way we 
should proceed to get a more reliable operation. It is obvious that uncertainty of any particular 
equipment or system can give us the different SIL requirements as compared to the traditional 
way of finding SIL level.  Then the decision may arise from that result as to take what further 
improvement measure for any system in SIS of reliability assessment. A literature study of 
uncertainty analysis was carried out in order to identify the main sources of uncertainty in 
reliability assessments for several subsea equipments and also to differentiate approaches for 
quantifying their effects. However, the broadly accepted standard for design and operation of 
SIS, IEC 61508, does not explicitly treat the subject of uncertainty.  Therefore, my focus is to 
contemplate clear concepts on uncertainty factors before going to make decisions on SIL level 
verification. I have done several calculations of PFDavg for various subsea equipments by 
considering different times of operation. I was highly fascinated to see the widely varying 
probability numbers from those calculations. And thus, I started to analyze why the failure 
rates are higher for some particular subsea equipments, which will be discussed in the later 
part of my thesis. Generally those failure rates comes from the uncertainties of those 
equipments which are causes of several factors such human involvement workplace, human 
error, hardware problem, software problem, lack of reliable data collection, poor management 
systems, typical work process between experienced and inexperienced personnel, 
inexperience personnel working on the new technologies etc. It was found that sensitivity 
analysis could also be an important measure to categorize uncertainties. There was important 
discussion about the human factors in process industries and several uncertainty evaluations 
according to the MTO (Human, Technology and Organization) perspectives. 
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Terminology 
IEC standards 61508- Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
(E/E/PE) safety related systems 
SIL – Safety Integrity Level 
SIS – Safety Instrumented System 
SIF – Safety Instrumented Functions 
PFD – Probability of Failure on Demand 
MTO – Human, Technology and Organization 
OREDA – The Offshore Reliability Data 
EPU – Electrical Power Unit 
HPU – Hydraulic Power Unit 
UPS – Uninterrupted Power Supply 
MCS – Master Control Station 
CIU – Chemical Injection Unit 
SDM – Subsea Distribution Module 
SCM – Subsea Control Module 
SCV – Solenoid Control Valve 
SSIV – Subsea Safety Isolation Valve 
LHS – Latin Hypercube Sampling 
LQM – Living Quarter Module 
BBSM – Behavioural Based Safety Management 
PTW – Permit to Work System 
PLDC – Process Leak Detection and Control 
ESD – Emergency Shutdown system 
PSD – Process Shutdown 
TSR – Temporary Safe Refuge 
EPCI – Engineering, Procurement, Commissioning and Installation 
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1. Introduction 
Functional safety occupies to identify specific requirements for safety process where 
hazardous failures lead to severe consequences (e.g. fatality) and then establishing highest 
tolerable incidence targets for each mode of failure. So any equipment whose failure 
contributes to a risk is termed as „‟safety-related‟‟ (David and Kenneth, 2005). 
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) consists of input elements, logic solvers and final elements  
in figure 1 which are engaged to manage and mitigate the risk to personnel, environment and 
assets in many industries and everyday life. The main purpose of SIS is to establish a safe 
state of equipment or the plant if a hazardous event happens (Abrahamsen and W. Roed, 
2010).  Each SIS has one or more Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), where every SIF 
within an SIS has a Safety Integrity Level (SIL). The IEC standards 61508/61511 states four 
safety integrity levels (SIL 1 – SIL 4) which can be shown in table 1. The higher the safety 
integrity level, the more strict becomes the requirements. There are many design requirements 
for each SIL level, including requirements of the average probability of failure on demand 
(PFDavg) (Abrahamsen and W. Roed, 2010) 
Therefore, the SIS is crucial for controlling and mitigating risk, in many industries and 
everyday life. Because of the main principle of a SIS and its degree of independence of 
human actions, reliability is of high importance. Reliability assessments of SIS offers an 
important foundation for decision making and are performed as part of conformity studies in 
order to verify whether a SIS meets stated safety requirements or not. Unfortunately, there are 
several aspects in a reliability assessment that cause uncertainty associated with the results. 
Uncertainty in reliability assessments reduces the confidence in the results, increases the risk 
of making wrong decision and should therefore be communicated to the decision maker. 
The main purpose of this master thesis is to deal with uncertainty in order to verify SIl level 
for several subsea equipments. Verification of safety integrity level can be established by two 
different ways according to this master thesis such as traditional approach and a new approach 
by Abrahamsen. The traditional approach is telling us the direct calculation of PFDavg  and 
then compared with the criteria for the different SIL level. However, this approach cannot be 
adequately important basis for decision makers to verify SIL only by seeing beyond the 
assigned probability of failure on demand.  There is a need for good design requirements of 
SIL verification according to the assigned probability number that can be covered in a new 
approach proposed by Abrahamsen. The key aspect of new approach is related to the 
uncertainty. The new approach is the way to tell more about how to treat uncertainties and 
argue that uncertainties should be taken into consideration more elaborately than we have 
seen in the traditional approach. In this approach we hereby acknowledge that the calculated 
probability should not be the only source for verifying the established quantitative SIL 
requirements. We are dealing uncertainties mainly by using reliable database such as 
OREDA, MTO perspectives and some experts‟ knowledge. However, this master thesis is 
dealing with uncertainties by analyzing some factors of uncertainties in line with MTO 
perspectives and background information found in the OREDA database.  
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2. Reliability of Safety Instrumented Systems 
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) provides a self-sufficient safety layer with the main 
objective to reduce the risk to personnel, environment and assets. There is a high importance 
of SIS where reliability and safety are to be considered as an important aspect and may be 
verified through conformity reports. This section represents important concepts and aspects 
related to SIS and its reliability. 
2.1 General 
A SIS is used to lessen risks associated with the operation of a specified hazardous system, by 
reducing the consequences. The specified hazardous system is term as equipment under 
control. The equipment under control is confined by safety instrumented functions (SIF) in a 
SIS or other appropriate safety measures that will control the hazard. The main features about 
SIS evaluated to other safety systems are capable to evaluate signals by the help of 
instrumentation. Figure 1 shows a simplified model of a SIS. 
 
 
Figure 1 Simplified model of a safety instrumented system (SIS) 
A SIS consists of three main elements; input elements for detection, logic solvers for 
evaluation and decisions and final elements for action if needed. Input elements may be gas or 
fire detectors, a logic solver may be a computer and the final element a safety valve.  
The main reliability measure for a SIF is called Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD). This 
measure calculates the safety unavailability due to unsystematic hardware failures and denotes 
the probability that a SIF will fail to react sufficiently upon a demand, a so‐ called dangerous 
failure.  
2.2 IEC 61508 
IEC 61508 "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) 
safety related systems" is a mostly accepted standard for design and operation of SIS. In the 
standard, a SIS is referred to as an E/E/PE safety related system. It is applicable to all kinds of 
industries. The oil and gas industry often uses the standard IEC 61511 “Functional safety – 
Safety instrumented systems for the process industry” instead. IEC 61508 requires a 
3 
 
quantitative and qualitative safety and reliability assessment in order to fulfil with the 
requirements given by the standard. There are two types of safety requirements (David and 
Kenneth, 2005); 
 Functional safety requirements describes what the safety function shall perform 
 Safety integrity requirements describes how well the safety function shall perform 
2.2.1 Safety Integrity 
The concept of safety integrity levels (SILs) is now widespread in the area of safety-critical 
systems and a number of standards support its use in the design and development of such 
systems. However, the outcomes of the SILs are not well understood. Whereas the concept is 
planned to assist the accomplishment and manifestation of safety, it is in many cases causing 
uncertainty and apprehension. 
The highest tolerable failure rate for each hazard normally tends us to establish an integrity 
target for each part of equipment, depending upon its comparative input to the hazard. These 
integrity targets are known as „safety-integrity levels‟ and are generally referred as four 
levels. A SIL is defined as “discrete level (one out of a possible four) for specifying the safety 
integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety related 
systems...”(IEC 61508, 1997).  
SIL 4: the highest target and mostly difficult to achieve, requiring state of the art techniques 
(usually avoided) 
SIL 3: less dangerous than SIL 4 but still requiring the use of sophisticated design techniques 
SIL 2: requiring good design and operating practice to a level not unlike ISO 9000 
SIL 1: the minimum level but still implying good design practice 
< SIL 1 or SIL 0: referred to (in IEC 61508) as „not-safety related‟ in terms of conformity 
(David and Kenneth, 2005) 
So it is defined as the “probability of a safety related system satisfactorily performing the 
required functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of time” (IEC 61508, 
1997). Safety integrity can here thus be interpreted as reliability. 
In order to document compliance with the standard, a reliability analysis of the SIS must 
document that the calculated PFDavg satisfies the quantitative hardware requirement, as shown 
in Table 1 and 2.  
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Table 1 Safety Integrity Levels on Low Demand mode of operation (IEC 61508, 1997) 
 
Table 2 Safety Integrity Levels on High Demand mode of operation (IEC 61508, 1997) 
The IEC 61508 states two modes of the E/E/PE systems for employing the safety-related 
functions, i.e. the low demand mode of operation and the high demand mode of operation. A 
low demand mode of operation can be established when the frequency of demands for 
operation is no longer greater than one per year and on greater than twice the proof test 
frequency. A high demand mode of operation can be defined as the frequency of demand for 
operation one per year or greater than twice the proof test frequency (Tomasz et el., 2010). 
During the SIL verification process, the average probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) is 
refer to the low demand mode of operation or the probability of dangerous failure per hour 
(PEH) is refer to the high demand mode of operation.  
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3. Different Approaches of SIL Verification 
3.1 Traditional approach  
The safety integrity levels for the different safety instrumented functions need to be verified 
according to the IEC standards 61508/61511. There are several ways to verify SIL but in this 
thesis we are highlighting traditional approach how to verify SIL according to the IEC 61508. 
This traditional approach for verification of the quantitative part (PFD) of the SIL level is 
generally done by a calculation of PFD and then by a comparison with SIL criterion 
established in IEC 61508.  
The basis for this calculation of PFD is to check whether SIL is established for any particular 
equipment or not. If the probability of failure on demand is in that range we can decide how 
severe that particular equipment is. But we cannot make any decision only by checking SIL to 
calculate PFD because there must be lots of factors related to the equipment failure. We will 
also on the new approach of SIL verification in later part. This part we will focus only 
traditional way how to verify SIL.  
The OREDA database was my most reliable data bank to calculate the average probability of 
failure on demand. I have done several calculations to determine SIL level by using failure 
rates from the OREDA database which can be shown both in traditional and new approaches 
of SIL verification sections. The main objective of the OREDA-2009 handbook is to present 
average failure rate estimates.  
The concept of failure rate function comes from the preventive maintenance because all 
preventive maintenance management programs are time driven. Meaning that the maintenance 
tasks are based on elapsed time or hours of operation (Tore Markeset, 2011) 
The failure rate function states how likely it is that an item that has continued to exist up to 
time, t, will tend to fail during next unit of time (OREDA, 2009). If any particular system or 
item is failing, this possibility will increase with the age t. For example, a person who has 
reached the age of 80 years will definitely have a higher probability of dying during the next 
year than a 20 years old person. Therefore, the failure rate function will be known as a 
function of the time – or, the age of that particular system or item. The mathematical 
expression for the failure rate function, z(t), is given below as (OREDA, 2009):  
 
z(t) = limΔt→0 1/Δt P(t < T ≤ t + Δt | T > t) 
 
Where, T is the time to failure, t means the item is still functioning at time t, Δt is the short 
time interval, (t, t + Δt) means the item will fail in that interval. 
The approximation of the above expression: 
z(t). Δt = Δt P(t < T ≤ t + Δt | T > t) 
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Therefore, the above expression determines that the probability of an item that has reached the 
age t will fail in the next interval (t, t + Δt). 
The failure rate function has different shapes in the life of any technical item. The life of a 
technical item is divided into three main phases such as early failure phase, useful life phase 
and wear-out phase. Those phases and estimators of failure rate can be shown in the 
appendices (part 3).                            
The above mentioned failure rate is the starting point to analyze the traditional approach. In 
this part I am going to demonstrate how to calculate PFDavg for several subsea equipments 
such as subsea manifold, subsea control systems, subsea control system-SSIV, subsea control 
system-Xmas tree, subsea flowlines and subsea pipelines. 
3.1.1 Subsea manifold  
Subsea manifold is the equipment for distributing oil and gas stream from the wells into the 
flowlines to be sent further the surface production facilities. Basically, subsea manifolds 
consist of steel pipes and valves designed for above purposes. It is one of the critical 
equipment because it regulates oil and gas flow to the topside. The figure below shows the 
block diagram of typical subsea manifold. The flowlines from the well is connected via 
manifold connector. Then the flow which is going to the main piping system of manifold is 
regulated by the branch valves. There is also one important features of subsea manifold which 
is the ability of facilitating of pigging operations. Pigging is the activities by launching 
specialized equipment for measuring important parameters in the piping systems and also for 
cleaning the internal pipe itself.    
 
Figure 2 subsea manifolds, boundary definition (OREDA, 2009) 
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Reliability block diagram of manifold: 
 
Figure 3 Reliability block diagram of manifold 
From the reliability block diagram of manifold module consists of several elements such as: 
C1, C2 is the tree to manifold connector,  
V1, V2 is the production control check valve, 
Brach valve, Main piping, Main valve, Manifold to flow-line connector, Chemical Injection 
valve and Hydraulic Coupling. 
The pig module includes connector, valve both for process and utility isolation and pig 
launcher. 
In this case we will find SIL level for this structure. By doing so, I used to follow OREDA 
database to calculate PFD average of each element. Here I use the mean failure rate per 10
6
 
hours from the OREDA database to calculate PFD average.  
The actual PFD average formula for single event is as follows: 
)1(
1
1  

ePDFavg  
And the minimum cut sets of the above reliability block diagram are: 
{1,8},{1,9},{1,10,11},{1,12},{1,13},{1,14},{1,15}, 
{2,8},{2,9},{2,10,11},{2,12},{2,13},{2,14},{2,15}, 
{3,4,8},{3,4,9},{3,4,10,11},{3,4,12},{3,4,13},{3,4,14},{3,4,15}, 
{5,8},{5,9},{5,10,11},{5,12},{5,13},{5,14},{5,15}, 
{6,8},{6,9},{6,10,11},{6,12},{6,13},{6,14},{6,15}, 
{7,8},{7,9},{7,10,11},{7,12},{7,13},{7,14},{7,15}, 
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{16},{17},{18},{19} 
The PFD average according to min cut sets: 
 

i
k
j
Ki
j
avg
jK
PDF 
 

1 1
1
 
PFDavg = 0.0085366 = 8.5 x 10
-3
 (SIL 2) 
The calculated PDFavg is for 1 month of operation and it will also remain SIL 2 until 60 days 
of operation.  
The PFDavg until 180 days of operation is given below:  
PFDavg = 0.417157229 = 4.17 x 10
-1
 (SIL 0) 
We can see clearly that the probability of failure on demand for subsea manifold increases 
when the operation time increase. It would be not safety related systems if we want to use 
after 60 days of operations. Therefore, there must be needed to focus after that time interval of 
operation by taking necessary maintenance and repair or checking of subsea manifold module.  
3.1.2 Subsea Control systems 
Subsea control system is the system used for controlling the operations of subsea related 
equipments as well as for gathering data collections and monitoring of important relevant 
parameters. The subsea control systems divided into two parts such as topside control system 
and subsea control system. The topside located systems such as Electrical Power Unit (EPU), 
Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU), and Master Control Station (MCS) and Chemical Injection Unit 
(CIU). The subsea control part covers Static Umbilical, Dynamic Umbilical, and Subsea 
Distribution Module (SDM), Subsea Control Module (s) (SCM), Sensors and Solenoid 
Control Valve.  
Subsea control systems are the heart of subsea operations because it controls what the 
equipment in the seabed should do and communicate with them. Here electrical power unit is 
very sensitive because it provides the main power supply and it also covers the power backup 
system from UPS and battery unit. The means of subsea controlling is done by hydraulic fluid 
supplied from HPU in the topside meanwhile the control command is via electrical signal 
from MCS. 
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Figure 4 Subsea control systems, boundary definition (OREDA, 2009) 
 
Reliability block diagram of subsea control systems: 
 
 
Figure 5 Reliability block diagram of subsea control systems 
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In this case we will find SIL level for this structure. By doing so, I used to follow OREDA 
database to calculate PFD average of each element. In this case I use the mean failure rate per 
10
6
 hours from the OREDA database to calculate PFD average.  
The actual PFD average formula for single event is as follows: 
)1(
1
1  

ePDFavg  
And the minimum cut set of this reliability block diagram: 
{1},{2,3,4},{5,6},{7},{8},{9,10} 
The PFD average according to min cut set: 
 

i
k
j
Ki
j
avg
jK
PDF 
 

1 1
1
 
PFDavg = 0.017422075 = 1.74 x 10
-2
 (SIL 1) 
The calculated PDFavg is for 1 month of operation and it will also remain SIL 1 until 180 days 
of operation. So the PFDavg until 180 days of operation is given below:  
PFDavg = 0.1052 = 1.05 x 10
-1
 (SIL 1) 
From the above two calculations of PFDavg , we can define which of the probability of failure 
on demand for subsea control systems is appropriate for SIL requirements.  Both calculations 
show that we can use that subsea control systems until 180 days of operation without any 
maintenance. However, it does not appropriate decision for the decision maker whether we 
should proceed or take into consider some other steps to get appropriate idea for SIL 
verification. We will discuss this one in uncertainty part also to see the variation of SIL level.  
3.1.3 Subsea Control systems – SSIV 
The SSIV (Subsea Safety Isolation Valve) is the safety critical equipment to isolate the 
pipelines in case of emergency condition. Subsea control systems contain the algorithm of 
how the SSIV should response in this condition. And it also provides hydraulic fluids to 
operate the valve.  
By using same reliability block diagram of subsea control systems we can calculate PDFavg 
for SSIV control systems.  
PFDavg = 0.0056709432 = 5.67 x 10
-3
 (SIL 2) for 1 month of operation 
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PFDavg = 0.034658501 = 3.47 x 10
-2
 (SIL 1) for 6 months of operation 
We can see that the probability of failure on demand for SSIV control systems increases when 
the operation time increase.  
3.1.4 Subsea Control systems – Xmas tree 
Subsea control systems for the Xmas tree involves the control of valves installed on the trees 
and it also involves monitoring of flow related parameters in the trees through the sensors 
installed. The means of controls is provided by SCM installed in each and every Xmas tree 
which provide the electrical and hydraulic power needed.  
The Xmas tree is the first and main connection to the well. If something happens in the wells 
which need immediate actions, the valve arrangement in the tree is the one that provides the 
means of isolation and protection.   
By using the following reliability block diagram of subsea control systems for Xmas tree we 
can calculate PDFavg for Xmas tree control systems.  
 
 
Figure 6 Reliability block diagram of subsea control systems 
 
PFDavg = 0.02375278 = 2.38 x 10
-2
 (SIL 1) for 1 month of operation 
PFDavg = 0.165500087 = 1.66 x 10
-1
 (SIL 1 but close SIL 0) for 6 months of operation 
 
Therefore, in that part also shows the variation of probability failure on demand for different 
time of operations. We will look through above criteria in uncertainty part in order to tell what 
is the safety integrity requirements should communicate well establish in safety related 
system.  
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3.1.5 Subsea Flowlines 
Subsea flowlines is the line that connects and transfers fluids (oil, gas, water or chemical) 
from one subsea unit to another subsea unit.  
 
 
Figure 7 Subsea flowlines, boundary definition (OREDA, 2009) 
 
Reliability block diagram of subsea flowlines: 
 
 
Figure 8 Reliability block diagram of subsea control systems 
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The subsea flowlines mainly consists of two parts such as pipe and subsea isolation system. 
The flowline – pipe includes external coating, connector, flexible and rigid pipe spool, 
insulation, safety joint, sealine. The subsea isolation system covers process isolation valve, 
protective and support structure.  
In this case we will find SIL level for this structure. By doing so, I used to follow OREDA 
database to calculate PFD average of each element. In this case I use the mean failure rate per 
10
6
 hours from the OREDA database to calculate PFD average.  
The actual PFD average formula for single event is as follows: 
)1(
1
1  

ePDFavg  
And the minimum cut set of this reliability block diagram: 
{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6,7},{8},{9},{10},{11} 
The PFD average according to min cut set: 
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PFDavg = 0.0377324 = 3.77x 10
-2
 (SIL 1) 
The calculated PDFavg is for 1 month of operation and it will also remain SIL 1until 90 days 
of operation.  
The PDFavg is for 6 months of operation will no longer be determined SIL requirements 
because of high failure rate comes from the long time operation.  
So the PDFavg is 0.226 for 6 months of operation (SIL 0) 
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3.1.6 Subsea Pipelines 
 
Figure 9 Subsea pipelines, boundary definition (OREDA 2009) 
 
Reliability block diagram of subsea pipelines: 
 
Figure 10 Reliability block diagram of subsea pipeline 
The subsea pipelines mainly consist of two parts such as pipe and subsea isolation system. 
The pipe includes connector, rigid pipe spool, safety joint, sealine. The subsea isolation 
system covers subsea isolation valve, process isolation valve, protective and support structure.  
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In this case we will find SIL level for this structure. By doing so, I used to follow OREDA 
database to calculate PFD average of each element. In this case I use the mean failure rate per 
10
6
 hours from the OREDA database to calculate PFD average.  
The actual PFD average formula for single event is as follows: 
)1(
1
1  

ePDFavg  
And the minimum cut set of this reliability block diagram: 
{1},{2},{3},{4,5},{6},{7},{8},{9} 
The PFD average according to min cut set: 
 
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1
 
PFDavg = 0. 015695206366 = 1.57 x 10
-3
 (SIL 1) 
The calculated PDFavg is for 1 month of operation and it will also remain SIL 2 until 60 days 
of operation.  
The PDFavg is for 6 months of operation will be also determined SIL 1 requirements but the 
probability of failure is tend to be higher than the above calculation for 1 month of operation. 
So the PDFavg is 0.0942914 for 6 months of operation (SIL 1) 
After doing the direct calculation of the average probability failure on demand for above all 
subsea equipments, we cannot tell whether that mean failure rate can give us appropriate idea 
of verifying SIL level. Therefore, the traditional approach cannot be well accepted approach 
to verify SIL requirements.   
3.2 A New Approach by Eirik Bjorheim Abrahamsen  
The safety integrity verification for safety related systems are an important step in safety life 
cycle and PFDavg which must be calculated to verify the safety integrity level (SIL). Since 
IEC 61508 does not show detailed explanations of the definitions and PFDavg calculations, it 
is quite difficult for reliability engineers to apply the use of standards as guidance. Moreover, 
the traditional approach does not give us any clue how to treat uncertainty to verify SIL. 
Hence, Abrahamsen proposed a new approach on how to take uncertainty into consideration 
when we are verifying SIL. In this master thesis we are considering uncertainty more 
extensively than seen in the traditional approach.  
The assigned probability for failure on demand is conditioned on a number of assumptions 
and suppositions which can be useful information for decision makers, but it is still necessary 
to consider uncertainty. The traditional approach only calculates the probability on failure 
demand, P (failure on demand) but if we consider uncertainty factors related to the particular 
equipment, to tell the reliability of that equipment we need to rely on experts‟ judgement or 
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accessors‟ degree of belief of that failure probability. That experts‟ judgement may be our 
background knowledge. In this case the mathematical expression can be expressed as P 
(failure on demand ⃒K) where K is the background knowledge. The background knowledge 
includes historical system performance data, system performance characteristics and experts‟ 
degree of belief. This master thesis also covers background information to collect reliable data 
to calculate PFD according to OREDA database.  
This new approach totally based on uncertainty workshop meaning that how we are dealing 
with uncertainty in real life situation. The assigned probability for the safety system is not an 
ideal tool to express uncertainty because calculated probabilities are conditioned on specific 
background information and knowledge (K). Therefore, there are more possibilities to 
produce poor predictions of the SIL requirements. By doing so, we are investing what are the 
factors or aspects of uncertainty that should be taken into consideration when a conclusion is 
made on the SIL level.  
At present the oil and gas industry does not consider any non-technical aspects of 
uncertainties in the PFD calculation methods. The Abrahamsen states that there is a close 
relation between the PFD calculation results and the SIL level conclusion. Hence we argue 
that uncertainties should be taken into consideration before making a final decision on the SIL 
level. For example, this could be established qualitatively in a workshop to the quantitative 
SIL verification analysis. Afterwards, we can make a decision to see the calculated new PFD 
prior to the SIL level conclusion. This approach is presented in figure 11 below refereeing 
both the traditional approach and the new approach suggested by Abrahamsen. We will give 
more examples of how information about uncertainties could be taken into consideration in 
the uncertainty evaluation part.  
 
Figure 11 Main principles of the suggested approach. (Abrahamsen, 2010) 
To make a better decision we hereby classified uncertainties into three categories: High, 
medium and low. The categorisation process found in both (Abrahamsen, 2010) and (Flag and 
Aven, 2009): 
High uncertainty: 
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One or more of the following conditions are met: 
 The assumptions made in calculations of P are seen as strong impacts on SIL 
verification 
 Data are not available, or are unreliable 
 There is a lack of agreement among experts 
 Less experience personnel handling new technologies 
 
Low uncertainty: 
All of the following conditions are met: 
 The assumptions made in calculations of P are seen as very reasonable 
 Much reliable data are available 
 There is a broad agreement among experts 
 
Medium uncertainty: 
All of the following conditions are met: 
 The conditions between those characterising high and low uncertainty 
 Environmental data collection during harsh situation 
Therefore, it is important to note that the degree of uncertainty must be seen through the effect 
of the probabilities changes which are assigned to the system for the calculation. For example, 
high uncertainty comes from the higher failure rates (ƛ) meaning that higher effect on the 
assigned probability number will refer us that the uncertainty parameter is high. The failure 
rates are the potential indicators to determine our uncertainty categorization. But it does not 
mean that higher failure rates lead to the higher uncertainty because of the other non-technical 
failure mechanism. There are a lot of factors related to the failure of any particular systems 
i.e. human error, hardware problem, software problem, poor management systems and typical 
work process between experienced and inexperienced personnel etc.  
However, if the degree of uncertainty seems to be higher but the assigned probability number 
is relatively insensitive to changes in the certain quantities, then the uncertainty classified 
could be medium or low. For example, if the probability number is same within the  SIL 
range, then we classify uncertainty according to the calculated higher to lower probability in 
that level. In that case the calculated PFDavg for subsea flowlines is in the SIL 1 for both 
traditional approach and new approach, but calculated probability of failure is higher in the 
new approach. This means that we have to take some steps i.e. risk reducing measures, to 
establish better SIL level. However, the uncertainty is not high for the subsea flowlines.  
3.2.1 SIL requirement for the subsea manifold by using this new approach 
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We can recall the reliability block diagram of subsea manifold in figure 3. Here we are 
considering the upper value of failure rate per 10
6
 hours of operation. The uncertainty lies 
here to estimate failure rate by using confidence interval. I am following the 90% confidence 
interval of failure rate (OREDA, 2009). So the uncertainty of the estimate failure rate may be 
presented as a 90% confidence interval. 
P ( L     u\ ) = 90% 
In general the upper value of failure rate is not practicable. It is very risky when we obtain the 
higher failure rate. The equipment will no longer be reliable if we get such kind of failure rate 
during operation.  
By considering the upper limit of failure rate, we calculated the PFD average for the subsea 
manifold for 1 month of operation is approximately 0.029749218 or 2.97 x 10
-2
. It can 
establish SIL 1. Therefore, this value indicates us to consider the safety integrity level 1 for 
subsea manifold. The PFD average for 6 month of operation is approximately 4.17 x 10
-1
. It 
can go to the SIL 0 which is no longer being acceptable to do the operation in that case. 
Therefore, here one thing comes in my mind why the probability of failure on demand is very 
higher if we go for operation up to certain time period. And continuously failure probability is 
higher during next unit time because of the abrupt comes from that particular equipment. 
There are a lot of factors related to that high failure which can be discussed in the uncertainty 
evaluation and uncertainty categorization part later on, but human factors is one of the most 
critical factors in the uncertainty studies. Because of the high failure rate for the subsea 
manifold we can expect operation until 30 days by using of it. Hence, it will no longer be 
accepted by reliability researchers or experts‟ working on it because that equipment cannot 
satisfy the SIL level if we want to use after 30 days of operations.  
3.2.2 SIL requirement for the subsea control systems by using this new 
approach 
Now we are going to do the same process for the subsea control systems as we did in subsea 
manifold. According to the figure 5 we can calculate the probability of failure on demand for 
subsea control systems.   
By considering the upper limit of failure rate, the calculated PFD average for the subsea 
control systems which is approximately 0.073403423 or 7.34 x 10
-2
. It can establish SIL 1. 
Therefore, this value refers us to consider the safety integrity level 1 for subsea control 
systems during 1 month of operation. But the probability of failure on demand goes higher as 
we consider more than 1 moth of operation. For example, the subsea control systems will 
longer be able to reliable at the time 180 days where we calculated PFDavg is 0.449199 or 4.4 
x 10
-1 
(SIL 0).  
In that case, we can recommend using subsea control systems until 30 days of operations 
because it would be difficult to establish stated safety requirements for SIL level afterwards.   
The calculated probability failure on demand for 6 months of operations tends us to see how 
severe that subsea control systems and it goes to go the SIL 0 or even higher probability of 
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failure. The causes of failures for subsea control systems can be seen in the uncertainty 
evaluation and uncertainty categorization part later on.  
3.2.3 SIL requirement for the subsea control systems - SSIV by using this 
new approach 
Here we will calculate probability of failure on demand for the subsea control systems - SSIV. 
We can refer the reliability block diagram of subsea control systems in figure 5 
By using the upper limit of failure rate, we calculated the PFD average for the subsea control 
systems - SSIV for 1 month of operation is approximately 2.04 x 10
-2
. It can establish SIL 1. 
The PFD average for 6 month of operation is approximately 1.27 x 10
-1
. It can go to the SIL 
1.  Therefore, those two different values indicate us to consider the safety integrity level 1 
until 180 days of operation for subsea control systems - SSIV. The uncertainty is not very 
higher up to that particular time of operations.  
3.2.4 SIL requirement for the subsea control systems – Xmas tree by using 
this new approach: 
We are going to same process as we did earlier part for the subsea control systems – Xmas 
tree. By using the reliability block diagram of subsea control systems – Xmas from figure 6 
we can calculate the probability of failure on demand.  
The PFD average for the subsea control systems – Xmas tree for 1 month of operation is 4.47 
x 10
-2
. It can establish SIL 1. Therefore, this value tells us to consider the safety integrity level 
1 for subsea control systems – Xmas. The PFD average for 6 month of operation is about 4.50 
x 10
-1
. It can go to the SIL 0 which is no longer being acceptable to do the operation in that 
case.  
The subsea control systems for Xmas tree again critical to do operation after 1 month, 
however, it can establish SIL level 1 up to 60 days of operations. Therefore, this system will 
no longer be reliable system if we want to use until 180 days of operations because of the high 
integrity of that equipment during longer period of time.   
3.2.5 SIL requirement for the subsea flowlines by using this new approach 
Now we are going to do the process for the subsea flowlines as we did in above part. We can 
recall the reliability block diagram of subsea flowlines in figure 8 
By considering the upper limit of failure rate, we calculated the PFD average for the subsea 
flowlines for 1 month of operation is approximately 1.45x10
-1
. It can establish SIL 1. 
Therefore, this value indicates us to consider the safety integrity level 1 for subsea flowlines. 
The PFD average for 6 month of operation is approximately 8. 71x10
-1
.  It can go to the SIL 0 
which is no longer being acceptable to do the operation in that case.  
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3.2.6 SIL requirement for the subsea pipelines by using this new approach 
Now we are going to do the process for the subsea pipelines as we did in earlier sections. We 
can recall the reliability block diagram of subsea pipelines in figure 10. 
By considering the upper limit of failure rate, we calculated the PFD average for the subsea 
pipelines for 1 month of operation is approximately 4.72 x 10
-2
. It can establish SIL 1. 
Therefore, this value indicates us to consider the safety integrity level 1 for subsea pipelines. 
The PFD average for 6 month of operation is approximately 2.85 x 10
-1
. It can go to the SIL 0 
which is no longer being acceptable to do the operation in that case.  
By doing so, my thesis concept of uncertainty can become immense interest. I started to 
analyse what are the factors related to those failure of subsea equipment and how to treat 
uncertainties. It is very obvious that human error is a major concern when we treat 
uncertainty. Human may make mistakes and that can go to serious damage of any system.  
My thesis work mainly deals with MTO perspective and it is my uncertainty workshop to 
analyse further improvement of SIL requirements. 
4. Uncertainty Analyses  
Uncertainty is the major consideration of this thesis in order to verify safety integrity level or 
SIL. Here I will discuss total thorough details of uncertainty factors related to the different 
phenomenon. The traditional method shows the SIL, only by the direct calculation of PFD 
average without uncertainty taken into consideration. My aim is to give appropriate ideas of 
uncertainty factors in this part. I will focus mainly on MTO perspective to threat uncertainty. 
At the same time I will give some theoretical background of uncertainty. Therefore, my 
background knowledge to threat uncertainty is the MTO perspective, OREDA database and 
some experts‟ judgment.  
Uncertainty is defined as the term “not certainly ascertainable or predetermined” (Webster 
1989). Uncertainty in reliability assessments thus shrinks our confidence in the results. It is 
very important to consider that the decision makers are aware of how the uncertainties are 
involved in the assessment process. 
Risk is something related to unpredictable and negative aspects of any future events A and 
their consequences C. It is well said that we cannot predict perfectly if these events will 
happen or not, and if these events occur, what the outcomes or consequences will be. Meaning 
that there is uncertainty U related to the both A and C. Therefore, the likelihood of those 
events and the consequences certainly comes from the calculated probabilities P, based on the 
experts‟ judgment or background knowledge (K).   
Uncertainty refers to something of unknown events and its consequences of any future 
activities which means that today we actually do not know what is going on in any particular 
events and what is the probability number of that event.  
Hence, we can refer risk is equal to the uncertainty about the consequences of an event seen in 
relation to the severity of the consequences, where severity is the way to represent the 
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consequences. So the uncertainties are mainly due to the consequences of any particular 
event. 
We are often confused to define risk and uncertainty. It is said that a low degree of 
uncertainty does not mean a low risk, or a high degree of uncertainty does not mean a high 
risk. Actually it depends on the assign probability distributions in this case. But in real case 
we cannot replace uncertainty U with the probability P. Because probability is only a tool to 
express uncertainty with respect to the event A and the consequence C. However, we cannot 
even agree with that tool because uncertainty is always hiding in the background knowledge 
(K). For example in the offshore oil and gas platform topside‟s equipment  such as Electrical 
Power Unit (EPU), the failure of electrical power unit (EPU) may arise from the critical 
failure mood of open circuit test or the failure from the transmission line of power supply unit. 
But in real case it might not be the reason, it may come from the degraded failure mood of 
insufficient power supply or short circuit test.  
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Therefore, risk is described by (A, C, C*, U, P, K), where A equals the initiating events, C 
equals the consequences of the activity, C* is a prediction of C, U is the uncertainty about 
what value C will take, and P is the probability of specific events and outcomes, given the 
background knowledge K. 
4.1 Uncertainty is a major factor to determine SIL requirements 
Uncertainty is a vital part of my thesis to determine SIL requirements. As we have discussed 
the relation between risk and uncertainty, here we will see how uncertainty affects our real 
life phenomenon. Our target was to calculate PDF average to determine SIL requirement 
which is termed as a traditional way of representing SIL. But in that method we cannot say 
about the reliability of any equipment or system. The IEC 61508 also states the SIL 
requirement for both low and high demand mood of operation. The traditional way is also a 
correct method to check whether the equipment meets the SIL requirement or not. Nowadays, 
most of the oil and gas companies also follow those methods.  
However, this thesis work is dealing with uncertainties to give clear idea of reliable operation 
up to certain periods of time. As we know all the subsea equipments must have certain life 
time of performance. So we cannot expect more reliable operation if we use those equipments 
for a long time. Because those equipments must be checked, controlled, maintained and 
repaired. According to the OREDA database, it shows the failure rate of such equipment is 
taking per 10
6
 hours of operation. I have done a lot of calculations by using OREDA database. 
I have made several assumptions to check whether those equipments are meeting the SIL 
requirements or not. It is noted that risk analyses are always based on number of such 
assumptions. 
By doing so, we can analyze various types of systems to give clear idea of risk score of the 
uncertainties (U).  We are giving concept of uncertainty in relation to the MTO perspectives 
and some other uncertainty factors.  If the assessments of uncertainties are shown high, then 
the factors are also of high risk.  
Evaluation of uncertainty is also an important measure to be taken that is shown in the later 
parts.  
4.2 Types of Uncertainty  
Reliability analysis expresses the uncertainty about the failure behaviour of a system. 
Uncertainty can be measured and described by its mathematical language, probability. 
Generally uncertainty or lack of knowledge can be quantified with the expert‟s degree of 
doubt about a parameter. In this case true values are unknown and can be only estimated.  
There are two types of uncertainty: (Spouge 1999) 
 Aleatory or Random uncertainty due to natural randomness that can be estimated by 
the repeated measurements. 
 Epistemic uncertainty due to lack of knowledge that can include uncertainties in 
modeling, data availability and collection.   
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Reliability analysis deals with many processes and systems which consist of aleatory 
uncertainties. It is for example impossible to predict exactly on which demand a Safety 
Instrumented System (SIS) will fail to respond. This is due to variability in the system that 
cannot be eliminated because of inherent randomness which causes events with stochastic 
properties. This is why also aleatory uncertainty often is referred to as “stochastic 
uncertainty” (Mosleh, et al. 1995). The epistemic uncertainty is the only reducible 
uncertainty, it is crucial to address the uncertainties correctly in order to achieve reduction if 
possible.  
At present time, with available technology and resources, it is practicable impossible to 
achieve complete knowledge about every system or process within reasonable time. The only 
advantage must be to separate those uncertainties that can be reduced from those that are less 
prone to reduction in nearest future (Kiureghian and Ditlevsen 2009).  
4.3 Interpretations of uncertainty 
Uncertainty can be defined as “lack of knowledge about the performance of a system” (Aven 
2003). Reliability assessments communicate the uncertainty about future events, often in 
terms of probabilities. Application of probability is a confession of our lack of knowledge, 
because it states the uncertainty related to the unknown events. This is also why probability 
has a wide area of utilization; it realizes quantification of uncertainty by using mathematical 
expressions. The mathematical theories behind probability are widely accepted, but how we 
interpret it, is not. This is an important issue when it comes to reliability analysis as a decision 
support; how we understand the results may be different, depending on our point of view. 
We can interpret uncertainty in two ways: 
I. Realist interpretation:  This is according to the realist interpretation which sees 
probability as a measure of a property, just like any other physical property (Watson 
1993).This one is in conflict with knowledge beyond what is considerably needed. It 
can be divided as classical, relative frequency and a priori theories. 
 
II. Subjective interpretation:  The subjective interpretation of probability defines 
probability as a degree of belief, which means that the same event can have different 
probability. The subjective probability represent is purely epistemic due to its nature 
of only being knowledge‐based. The use of subjective probability is lacking the 
objectivity that is required in scientific problem solving or analyses of severe 
problems like reliability analysis. But subjective probability can often be used in 
combination with other applications when there is lack of quality data. Bayesian 
update with expert judgment is an example of that. 
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Table 3 Concepts of uncertainty and related representations (Flage, Aven and Zio, 2009) 
4.4 Different approaches of uncertainty assessments 
Risk and reliability assessments occupy uncertainties due to the nature of the assessment 
methods. Uncertainty assessment is an important medium when decision makers making 
decisions under uncertainty. There is an important relation between the reliability assessment 
and the uncertainty assessment. But the main difference between a reliability assessment and 
an uncertainty assessment is that reliability assessments define the aleatory uncertainty about 
the future failure attitude of a system, while uncertainty assessments say more about epistemic 
uncertainty about the information (model output) which the reliability assessment provide. 
There are three main methods used for quantifying the effect uncertainty assessments: 
I. Sensitivity analysis 
II. Importance measures  
III. Uncertainty propagation  
4.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity can be defined as the how the variation in the model output to change in the input. 
An input may be a model element like a numerical parameter value for a component or a 
model assumption. Simulation models are needed to carry out sensitivity studies. We can 
utilize them as a tool to understand complex phenomena and to support decisions (Owen et 
al., 2011). The knowledge base is characterized by a large degree of uncertainty: imperfect 
understanding, subjective values and etc. In reservoir modelling, for example, the high degree 
of uncertainty relates to geophysical parameters, temperature and pressure. Drawing the figure 
is the easiest way to present the simplified concept of sensitivity studies:  
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Figure 12 Simplified diagram for the sensitivity analysis (Owen et al., 2011) 
The diagram demonstrates that errors in the data go further to simulation models. By adding 
resolution levels, model structures and parameters we get a result from the simulation model 
to be used in the sensitivity analysis. With the help of it the feedback on input data and model 
factors goes back to the beginning of the sequence and the process starts again. 
However, the simplified diagram of sensitivity analysis is not actual model for my master 
thesis because I have not done any further computer simulation. But I have covered basic 
concept of sensitivity analysis by doing several iterations of probability of failure on demand. 
I have analyzed different PFDavg values and its effect on the SIL verification.    
Sensitivity analysis study‟s how the uncertainty in the model output can be related to different 
uncertainties in the model input. That will identify inputs that are relevant for prediction and 
find the way to mitigate the uncertainty in order to increase the reliability of predictions 
(Frantzich, 1998). The result of sensitivity analysis will be robust only if the amount of 
alternative assumptions is wide enough and interval of inferences is narrow enough. 
Sensitivity analyses can therefore be considered as useful methods to identify what are the 
sources of uncertainty where we can study those parameters in reliability analysis. 
Afterwards, sensitivity analyses can also be used as a quality assurance tool for the better 
application in reliability studies. Therefore, model uncertainty does not exist in case of 
sensitivity studies and hence avoidance of model uncertainty comes from that concept. 
  
• Errors
DATA
• Simulation 
models
MODEL OUTPUT
• Sensitivity 
analysis
Feedback on input 
data and model 
factors
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4.4.2 Importance measures 
A sensitivity studies provides the relevant background knowledge about how the output 
parameter changes by considering different input values. It is always good approach to have 
appropriate measures after considering sensitivity analysis. The different reliability structures 
can bring the different results or even the same component in that reliability structures may 
have different importance measures. For example, the series structure must have to achieve 
higher reliability than the parallel structures. It is necessary to consider the component 
importance in both aspects of model input and model structures. It is therefore important to 
rank components with respect to quantitative sensitivity assessment which is called important 
measures. There are several ways to rank the relative values of the components with regard to 
improvement potential and contribution to unavailability. After the ranking of those 
components we can refer for further analysis to mitigate risk or to control the failure of such 
systems. There may be several methods to the risk analysis in that case and at the same time 
we can also analyse risk based decision making. Therefore, Importance measures can be a key 
element of sensitivity analyses.  
4.4.3 Uncertainty propagation 
When the sensitivity analysis and important measures gives direct impact on the changing 
input values to the output values, uncertainty propagation will be importantly considerable 
because of how uncertainty related to the input values changes onto the output values 
(deRocquigny, Devictor and Tarantola 2008). The uncertainty is generally following the 
probabilistic approach.  
The probabilistic framework for uncertainty propagation follows a two step process (NASA 
2002); 
I. First, assign a probability of failure on demand (PFDavg) to each of the random 
(uncertain) input parameters. The PFDavg reflects the state of knowledge and 
represents the epistemic uncertainty related to the parameter. The PFDavg can be 
selected from different distributions, depending on what properties that is best suited 
for the component or system they represent. In reliability analysis, the lognormal or 
gamma distribution is usually used as PFDavg for data uncertainty. In my thesis, I used 
the PFD average formula for single components by using minimum cut sets methods. 
 
II. Then, generating a PFDavg for the output function by combining the input PFDavg 
In this method we can refer the combined PFDavg to reflect the uncertainty associated with 
reqired reliability target of SIL. Figure 13 shows the relation between the uncertain 
parameters, λ, the uncertain events like the unavailability of components, x, and the reliability 
of the system as a function of x, R = h (x1, x2 ...). In this process, there are three methods are 
used to propagate uncertainty; simulation, moment propagation and discrete probability 
distribution (NASA 2002). This tool is quite useful in simulation techniques due to the 
integrated software solutions. 
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Figure 13 Uncertainty propagation (NASA 2002) 
There are two common sampling techniques in software tools at present time using widely 
which is the Monte Carlo or Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS). 
4.4.3.1 Monte Carlo sampling 
Monte Carlo sampling is random methods for sampling tools where this method generates 
random failure times for each component‟s failure distribution.  
A problem with Monte Carlo sampling is that the samples are more likely to be shown from 
areas of the distribution where the probability of occurrence is higher. The extreme values are 
then likely to not be represented sufficiently in samples. In order to solve this problem, a high 
number of repetitions are needed and this may be quite extensive and time consuming. This 
issue is problematic for reliability models that employ skewed probability distributions like 
the lognormal or gamma distribution, where the right tail may be long (Morgan and Henrion 
1990). 
4.4.3.2 Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS) 
Latin Hypercube sampling (LHS) was developed in order to solve the problem with sampling 
of extreme values which Monte Carlo sampling introduced. In order to ensure that the whole 
spectre from a distribution is represented in a sample, LHS use a stratified, also known as 
sampling method. The cumulative distribution function for an input parameter is divided into 
n intervals, where n is the number of simulations to be run. In contrast to Monte Carlo 
sampling, LHS samples a random value from the input PFD from within each interval, 
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without replacement. The generation of a random variable within an interval is found in the 
same way as for Monte Carlo sampling. It is the layered sampling, where one interval is 
selected only once, that is the main difference. In this way, the coverage of the distribution 
domain is uniform and more representative and hence a smaller number of samples are 
needed. 
4.5 Failure rates as an uncertainty 
The failure rate is an important aspect to be considered in uncertainty analysis. I have done 
several calculations by using failure rates to calculate PFD average for several subsea 
equipments. For different failure rates we have decided to consider different SIL level. It is 
important measures to be considered as a measure of uncertainty because of the different 
probability number in various cases. Then decision makers can make good decisions to see 
different SIL level for those subsea equipments. 
4.6 Sensitivity vs. Uncertainty 
It is common to mix the expressions “uncertainty” and “sensitivity”. Generally speaking, 
uncertainty and sensitivity analyses investigate the robustness of a study including 
mathematical modelling. But it should be noticed that a sensitivity analysis is not the same as 
uncertainty analysis, also called uncertainty propagation. This is because the sensitivity 
analysis does not express the uncertainty related to the uncertain inputs, only the effect of 
changes of them. The analyst may, however, based on the sensitivity study understand which 
model input or assumptions that may be crucial for level of uncertainty in the assessment, 
based on their importance. Hence, a sensitivity study is well suited as a basis for an 
uncertainty analysis. 
While sensitivity analysis identifies what source of uncertainty weights more on the study's 
conclusions, an uncertainty analysis is the only technique that actually describes the level of 
uncertainty related to the conclusions.  
4.7 Decision making under uncertainty 
Decision making is an important aspect to be considered in uncertainty analysis. The 
following discussion of decision making analysis might be good measures to analyse further 
decision to make appropriate decision to verify SIL level. 
The risk management and decision making under uncertainty can be divided into four tasks: 
(Aven 2003) 
I. Identification and generation of options 
II. Assessment of these options 
III. A complete evaluation and judgement of options 
IV. Decision: selection of options 
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A complete model for decision making under uncertainty is presented in Figure 14 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14  A model for decision making under uncertainty (Aven 2003) 
The decision support created by the analyses must be checked by the decision maker prior to 
making decision. However, most of the experts and managers accept a perspective for 
decision making under uncertainty that is mostly risk -based rather than risk- informed. Their 
aim is to enhance the analysis (Scientific) part and reduce the management (non-scientific) 
part. 
The uncertainties associated with the results should be reported to the decision maker such 
that he or she is aware of the risks related to the decision. A framework for integrating 
uncertainty into the basis for decision making is presented in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15 Integrated decision making for hardware safety integrity 
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4.8 Human involvement in operating production facilities and its 
characteristics 
Human can become asset as well as liability in operating complex production facilities. Every 
business activity including production facility involves human as its driver. Human are there 
to make the production facility runs according to the needs from which it is built. Therefore, 
human have important role in operating production facility. Human can become asset which 
means that human directly or indirectly generate income for the company they work for in 
operating facility. Human manage, monitor, control and optimize almost each and every 
activity or part in the production facility in order to make sure the production facility runs 24 
hours a day and 7 days a week without downtime. It shall have positive outcome to a 
company so human are asset a company has. Besides having been seen as asset, human are 
also considered as liability for a company. Human make mistakes and human have limits 
physiologically, psychologically as well as emotionally. In addition to that, operating complex 
production facility is not a simple task and it often pushes human to their limit. It makes them 
vulnerable to do slips or mistakes which may cause loss to a company. That‟s why human are 
also seen as liability possible to cause negative outcome to a company.  
Human characteristics approach to illustrate human as asset and as liability at the same time: 
 Physiological 
Human relies on five senses to orient themselves with their surroundings. Human 
sense (to some extent) can be more reliable compare to technological equipment seen 
from cost-effective analysis. In offshore living quarters module (LQM), there are 
many manual break glass to activate alarm system. The manual break glass is the 
safety supplemental equipment to all active smoke detectors located in ceiling (to 
detect burning furniture) and above ceiling (to detect burning cable). These active 
detectors fail simultaneously and will be hidden undetected until next inspection 
routine. If something happen to the cable inside ceiling which might firstly cause 
smoke, it will remain undetected by technology, but human have senses to smell or see 
the smoke. He can use the break glass and control system will do further set up logic 
to suppress the problem. In this way, human are asset in operating complex facility. 
Human senses gradually decrease along with physical fatigue. Working for many 
hours in front of big monitors in control room causes sight sense decreases leading to a 
possibility in wrong parameter reading and wrong action taking. It may cause negative 
outcome to the facility and therefore human is also a liability. 
 Psychological 
Human have thinking and emotions. Quick thinking in taking critical decision is one 
of the most favorable soft competencies to a company operating complex facility. This 
is related to cognitive perspective in human information processing. In offshore 
platform control room, many operation parameters are being monitored and controlled. 
All this information can be very complex especially mature platform where 
equipments have degraded, huge amount of data have been stored, software 
calculation and equipments response time have decreased. In this case, role of 
experience operators who know the facility very well becomes critical. Human act as 
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compensator to those problems. Their quick thinking and problem solving ability 
make it possible to avoid negative outcomes. In the other hand, human working in 
hazardous and complex facility without anything goes wrong will gradually forget 
safety precaution. They may take shortcut such as suppress safety precaution. For 
example: Deepwater Horizon personnel live with a lot of false alarms. This condition 
forced them to suppress the alarm which made them vulnerable to intercept the real 
problem quick enough. 
 Sociological 
Human have a wide opportunity to develop interpersonal relationship. This 
interpersonal skill can be helpful to increase safety and positive work manner. For 
example: there is a program called behavioral based safety management (BBSM) 
applied by Shell in offshore production activity. The program is intended to remove 
unsafe acts in their offshore day to day activities. Each personnel is trained to observe 
other personnel working behavior and talks to whom they consider are doing unsafe 
act and provides safe solutions. This program provides wide opportunity to develop 
interpersonal relationship among personnel working in the same platform so that 
possibility of negative outcome can be suppressed further down. But in real 
implementation, this program is not 100% reliable. For example: very experience 
personnel such as ship captain or drilling superintendent sometimes are very difficult 
to give advice to especially by young and new personnel in their facility. This is the 
drawback whose solution needs to be found by management level.   
 Behavioral 
Human have a diverse views toward working behavior. This makes human as both 
asset and liability in operating production facility. Young and new engineers have 
tendency to accept many tasks and tries to show exceptional work. They often try to 
work harder and reach target earlier than schedule. This is of course favorable to 
company. While senior engineers with all of their experiences are no longer hard 
workers but they work efficiently and give advices to young engineers. This is also 
favorable to a company. The difference in working behavior places human as asset in 
operating production facility as they give potential benefit to the company. On the 
other hand, the working behavior showed by young engineers exposed them to making 
mistakes. Taking too many tasks in the same time makes split their concentration. 
Lack of concentration in doing work may cause wrong judgment which is possible to 
lead to errors. Here is the liability part of human in operating complex production 
facility as seen from behavioral characteristics.    
4.9 Evaluation of uncertainty 
After doing all the analysis for uncertainty analysis, it is important to consider evaluation of 
uncertainty. However, there are lots of uncertainty factors to be unknown due to the proper 
way to handing uncertainty in oil and gas sectors. I started to think why the failure rates are 
very high. For example, if we can remember the Piper Alpha accident or BP‟s Gulf of Mexico 
accident, how severe it was? Those accidents were extremely sad news for oil and gas 
industries as well as the great impact on the environment. In my thesis I presented the barrier 
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failures of Piper Alpha accidents only because to start what are the uncertainty factors 
involved in any particular accidents or dangers failure of any systems. It was easier in this 
thesis to analyze uncertainty factors for the several subsea equipments. Table 4 and 5 shows 
the uncertainty evaluation according to the MTO perspectives for the Piper Alpha accidents 
and the subsea control systems, respectively.  
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Table 4 Evaluation of MTO perspective on the Piper Alpha barriers failure (cont. next page)
Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability
1.Permit to work system 
(PTW)
-Lack of formal 
trained contractor’s 
staff.
 -Didn’t pay attention 
how to make safe 
system of work.
-Need better trained 
personnel 
Absence of a 
guideline for locking 
off isolation valves
-Provide secure 
techniques to lock 
isolation valves.
-To computerize the 
PTW system
-Operator did not 
monitor the 
standardization of 
PTW system and they 
did not follow the act 
abide by Performing 
Authority. 
-Authority was 
unable to support a 
good communication 
system.
-Check regularly 
validation of PTW.
-Authority must 
provide a better 
communication 
system to make sure 
that planned critical 
tasks from all 
affected staff.
-Lack of criticality of 
maintenance.
 -Lack of operators 
safety philosophy 
and methods of 
doing work.
-Provide detailed 
communication 
during crew change.
-Monitoring 
regularly the PTW 
task.
-Special emphasis 
on SMS.
2.Process Leak Detection 
and control (PLDC)
-Lack of 
communication
-Between 
maintenance crew 
and control room 
operators or poorly 
engineered system
Provide experienced, 
trained operating 
crew
-Lack of new 
technology to 
construct, operate 
and maintain such 
system
-New technologies 
can cope with 
complex design and 
close coupling to 
control process leak
-Management did not 
realize in crisis 
management.
-And proper 
detection system.
-Management must 
invest in better 
training , better 
incentives to 
qualified operators, 
human-system 
interfacing devices 
-Lack of effective 
early warning 
system.
- Lack of physical 
detection system, 
emergency shutdown 
system and fire 
suppression system.
-Improved PLDC can 
reduce the fire and 
explosion (See table 
in appendices)
3.Fire and gas detection 
and emergency 
shutdown systems
-The crew did not 
follow the guidelines 
for the process of 
how to set off ESD 
valve. 
-The crew must 
follow the list of 
valve operation
-Signals from gas 
detection system had 
led to automatic ESD
-the ESD of gas 
pipeline was 
separated from 
platform ESD
-Some of ESD was 
not closed fully
- Gas ,smoke and 
fire detection must 
set off ESD
-Use of IR(infra-red) 
fire detector much 
more reliable rather 
than UV (ultra-
violet) devices
-The safety and 
compliance 
management did not 
put emphasis on Fire 
Fighting Equipment 
regulations
-Didn’t follow the 
procedures for flow 
control
-Company must take 
control of the design, 
operation and 
maintenance of 
process plant
-They could not 
detect the signals 
from gas pipelines
-Improper 
arrangement of ESD 
-Need high quality 
information of gas 
detection
-Proper activation of 
ESD valves in case 
of safety case
Barriers Human Technology Organization Work process
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Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability
4.Control of fire and 
explosion
-Blowdown of ESD
-Explosion mitigating by venting
-Active and passive fire 
protection
-Water suppression system
-Fire pump system 
-Crew had low level 
of understanding of 
test procedure of 
process 
shutdown(PSD) and 
emergency 
shutdown.
-From the ‘reference 
area’ concept the fire 
fighting team did not 
follow guidelines for 
water deluge system.
-The crew must 
understand the 
criticality of 
equipment and its 
PSD and ESD system.
-Personnel should 
follow safety 
assessment of fire 
and explosion 
protection system
-Ventilation and 
ballast wall system 
was not good enough 
to mitigate explosion
- Lack of hydrocarbon 
fire test
-Sufficient 
Ventilation is 
needed to remove 
flammable gases.
-Provide electrical 
installation 
(Equipment) to 
reduce ignition.
-The authority did not 
monitor regular 
update from the 
operation and safety 
representative
-The authority must 
put strict rules and 
regulations for 
safety systems of 
different fire and 
explosion hazards
-the Water deluge 
system including fire 
pump system was 
not able to survive 
severe accident 
conditions
-the operators was 
unable to conduct a 
fire risk analysis 
because they were 
waiting for 
legislation from 
regulatory body
-the location and 
resistance of fire 
and ballast walls 
must be determined 
by safety 
assessment
-the function, 
capacity, 
availability, and 
protection of Water 
deluge system 
should follow safety 
assessment
5.Failure to prevent 
fatalities
-Temporary safe refuge
-Protection of accommodation
-Evacuation, Escape and Rescue
-The crew specially 
OIM did not give 
order for evacuation 
during emergency 
situation
-crew must have 
safety training.
-the OIM specialist 
should maintain the 
follow up procedure 
during Evacuation, 
escape.
- The alarm system 
did not work properly
-Most technical error 
occurred after the 
initial explosion
- Should use the 
better device to 
keep the system 
work so that crew 
will be aware of the 
even in emergency 
conditions.
-The authority did not 
follow up the routine 
maintenance work 
and regular 
emergency exercises  
-Regulatory body 
should check the 
evidence and 
regulatory 
requirements for 
safe and complete 
evacuation, escape 
and rescue
-The safety team had 
a problem to give 
order during 
emergency situation 
at PA so that most of 
the worker did not 
get any information 
what to do in short 
time.
-TSR should the 
centre of safety 
case.
-Goal-setting 
regulations in 
offshore industry 
must be followed in 
case of emergency 
situation to set up 
flexible working 
hours.
Barriers Human Technology Organization Work process
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Table 5 Uncertainty evaluation of subsea control system 
Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability Evaluation Applicability
1.Electrical Power 
Unit (EPU)
-Lack of formal 
trained staff.
 -Less attention how 
to make safe system 
of work.
-Need better trained 
personnel 
-electrical failure due 
to erratic output.
-Sticking of power 
coupler due to the 
common cause and 
fail to lock.
-Less knowledge of 
new equipment
-Provide secure 
technology.
-Limited experience 
with the subsea 
electrical system.
-Head of power of 
branch should 
monitor the 
standardization of 
power supply unit.
-Lack of  good 
communication 
system.
-Check regularly 
validation of EPU.
-Authority must 
provide a better 
communication 
system to make sure 
that planned critical 
tasks from all 
affected staff.
-Blockage of power 
and electrical failure 
of power supply unit 
due to transmission 
failure. 
-Lack of operators 
safety philosophy 
and methods of 
doing work.
-Provide detailed 
communication 
during crew change.
-Monitoring regularly 
the general electrical 
task.
2. Hydraulic Power 
Unit (HPU)
-Lack of 
understanding of 
signal.
-Control failure.
Provide experienced, 
trained operator
-Some unknown 
material failure. 
-Lack of new 
technology to 
construct, operate 
and maintain such 
system.
-New technologies 
can cope with 
complex design can 
give information of  
the faulty signal
-Management does 
not have more 
control to collaborate 
with operator 
working here. 
-Management must 
invest in better 
training, better 
incentives to provide 
better technical 
equipment. 
-Lack of effective 
early warning 
system.
-Human-system 
interfacing devices 
are needed.
-Need to establish 
alarm system to 
avoid unwanted fault 
of signals.
3.Master Control 
Station (MCS)
-The control or signal 
failure due to less 
experience operator
-The crew must 
follow the proper 
guidelines of control 
systems of MCS.
-Some times fail to 
function on demand.
-Failure due to the 
spurious operation.
- Need fully function 
technology   .
- Need fully 
integrated solutions.
-The management 
should arrange 
meeting to know 
regular updates of 
signal and its control.  
-Company must take 
control of the design, 
operation and 
maintenance of such 
system
-Some times fail to 
detect the signal 
from the EPU.   
-Improper 
arrangement of 
control system.
-Need high quality 
information of 
equipment solution
4. Chemical 
Injection Unit (CIU)
-Leakage of chemical 
injection coupling so 
it is coming from 
utility of external 
leakage.
-human error is 
accounted as 
medium risk of fluid 
lost.
-The crew must 
understand the 
external leakage of 
chemical coupler
-Lack of good design 
of process area
-Sufficient utility 
medium should 
establish.
-Need good design of 
chemical coupler.
-The authority does 
not monitor regular 
update from the 
operation 
-The authority must 
put strict rules and 
regulations for safety 
systems of different 
chemical injection 
systems
-The problem with 
new subcontractors.
-The location must 
be guided by the 
experience 
subcontractors.
5. Static and 
Dynamic Umbilical
-The control failures 
involve the personnel 
working on the 
umbilical termination 
unit. 
-Crew must have 
known better 
understanding of 
control failures.  
- The dynamic 
umbilical failure are 
mostly severe than 
the static umbilical 
failure
- Should use the 
better device to 
control the seal, 
tension and motion 
of equipment.
-The authority does 
not follow up regular 
maintenance 
programs. 
-regulatory body 
should make a 
regular inspection in 
ordewr to reduce 
control failures of 
umbilicals
-The topside and 
subsea umbilical 
termination must 
have Proper 
knowledge of work 
process
-Should follow some 
procedures for 
control faiulures of 
umbilical unit
Equipment Humans Technology Organization Work process
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4.9.1 Uncertainty Categorization for different subsea equipments 
The uncertainty evaluation of several subsea equipments was the good approximation to come up with an ideal solution how to treat 
uncertainties. By considering MTO perspective we can say that failure arise in generally human involvement work places, some technical aspects 
like new technologies, hardware and software problem etc., some operational aspects like joining new subcontractor from different continent or 
less experience subcontractors etc. The above mentioned factors can be carried out main consideration on the MTO perspectives because of the 
higher uncertainty. However, there some other factors also related to medium and low category of uncertainty such as crew training on human 
involvement work place, environmental location such as operation carried out in harsh environment situation, some procedures and standards for 
documentation and maintenance task as operational aspects. The following table 6 shows the uncertainty categorizations for the subsea manifold, 
subsea control systems, subsea control systems – SSIV, subsea control systems – Xmas tree, subsea flowlines and subsea pipelines.  
No Subsea 
Equipments 
Uncertainty categorization 
High Medium Low 
1 Manifold 
 
 
 
Leakage and material failure of 
process isolation valve,  
Deformation of main or branch 
valve 
Blockage of main or branch valve, 
Corrosion in main piping, Sticking and 
corrosion of process isolation valve 
Leakage and material failure of manifold 
connector, Blockage of main piping and 
process isolation valve, Wear and breakage 
of process isolation valve 
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2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsea 
control 
systems 
Control failure of subsea electronic 
module and subsea umbilical 
termination unit; 
Isolation fault of power coupler; 
Leakage of solenoid control valve. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Leakage of chemical injection 
coupling and subsea umbilical 
termination unit; Faulty signal of 
combined pressure and temperature 
sensors, subsea electronic module, 
subsea umbilical termination unit; 
Blockage of pressure sensor and 
solenoid control valve; Electrical and 
software failure of subsea umbilical 
termination unit;  Burst of 
hydraulic/chemical jumper. 
 
 Breakage, deformation, isolation fault, 
fatigue, material failure, mechanical failure, 
out of adjustment, no power and sticking of 
subsea umbilical termination unit; Leakage 
of topside umbilical termination unit, 
subsea electronic module, hydraulic 
coupling, hydraulic/chemical jumper, 
hydraulic line and subsea accumulator; 
Blockage of flow sensor, hydraulic 
coupling, hydraulic/chemical jumper, 
hydraulic line, power coupler and other 
components; No signal from combined 
pressure and temperature sensor, pressure 
sensor, subsea electronic module. 
  
3 
 
 
 
Subsea 
control 
systems – 
SSIV 
 Blockage of hydraulic/chemical 
line failure; Control failure of 
hydraulic power unit; Some 
unknown failure from dynamic 
umbilical unit. 
 Failure from the subsea and topside 
umbilical termination unit, power line 
of dynamic umbilical, combined 
pressure and temperature, hydraulic 
coupling and power supply unit. 
 Hydraulic line failure in static umbilical 
unit; failure of power jumper in subsea 
distribution unit; failure from the solenoid 
control valve and subsea electronic module 
in subsea control module; failure of 
pressure and temperature sensor 
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4  Subsea 
control 
systems – 
Xmas tree 
 
 
 
 
 Control/signal failure of master 
control station and HPU; External 
and internal leakage, spurious 
operation and abnormal instrument 
reading of HPU. 
 Transmission failure and insufficient 
power from EPU; Abnormal 
instrument reading, low performance, 
short circuit, stuck and vibration from 
the HPU; Erratic output, insulation 
failure and spurious operation from the 
MCS; Subsea control module (SCM) 
fail to function on demand; 
Control/signal failure from sensors. 
 Sensors fail to function on demand; 
Failure from the 
flow/pressure/temperature/valve position 
sensor; Failure of hydraulic line, power 
line, armour, subsea and topside umbilical 
termination unit in static umbilical; Failure 
from the subsea accumulator, filter, 
hydraulic coupling, power supply unit, 
power coupler, solenoid control valve and 
subsea electronic module in subsea control 
module (SCM); Failure from the subsea 
accumulator, chemical injection coupling, 
hydraulic coupling, hydraulic jumper, 
power coupler and power jumper in subsea 
distribution module (SDM). 
  
5  Subsea 
flowlines 
Failure of protective structure in 
subsea isolation system; Insulation 
failure of pipe; Trawl board impact 
due to structural deficiency in 
sealine. 
Leakage of flexible pipe spool and 
pipe connector; Failure of safety joint 
in pipe; Control failure of process 
isolation valve. 
Blockage and material failure of sealine; 
Failure of external coating in pipe; Support 
structure in subsea isolation system. 
6 Subsea 
pipelines 
Process isolation valve fail to close 
on demand and fail to open/unlock. 
Mechanical failure of subsea isolation 
valve due to delayed operation/control 
failure/external leakage in subsea 
isolation system;  
Blockage and control failure of process 
isolation valve; Corrosion, leakage, 
material and instrument failure of subsea 
process isolation valve; Failure from the 
sealine and rigid pipe spool. 
Table 6 Uncertainty categorization for several subsea equipments 
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5. Summary of SIL level calculation for two different 
approaches 
The following table 7 shows the summary of the PFDavg calculations and the SIL level for 
each subsea equipments by using two different approaches.  From the above all calculation we 
can see how SIL level varies from the traditional approach to the new approach. For some 
subsea equipments even were not meet the SIL requirements. For example, SIL level for 
subsea manifold go down very quickly in the new approach of SIL verification.  
Subsea 
equipment / 
SIL level 
Average probability of failure demand for  
a different proof-test interval 
Traditional Approach New Approach 
1 month 
interval (per 
10
6
 hours of 
operation) 
6 months 
interval (per 
10
6
 hours of 
operation) 
1 month 
interval (per 
10
6
 hours of 
operation) 
6 months 
interval (per 
10
6
 hours of 
operation) 
Manifold 8.54 x 10
-3
 2.38 x 10
-1
 2.97 x 10
-2
 4.17 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
manifold 
SIL 2 SIL 0 SIL 1 SIL 0 
Subsea control 
systems  
1.74 x 10
-2
 1.05 x 10
-1
 7.34 x 10
-2
 4.49 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
Subsea control 
systems 
SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 0 
Subsea control 
system : SSIV 
5.67 x 10
-3
 3.47 x 10
-2
 2.04 x 10
-2
 1.27 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
subsea control 
system : SSIV 
SIL 2 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 
Subsea control 
system : Xmas 
tree 
2.38 x 10
-2
 1.66 x 10
-1
 4.47 x 10
-2
 4.50 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
subsea control 
system : Xmas 
tree 
SIL 1 
SIL 1 ( but 
very close to 
SIL 0) 
SIL 1 SIL 0 
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Subsea 
flowlines 
3.77x 10
-2
 2.26x 10
-1
 1.45 x 10
-1
 8.71 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
subsea 
flowlines 
SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 0 
Subsea 
Pipelines 
1.57 x 10
-2
 9.43 x 10
-2
 4.72 x 10
-2
 2.85 x 10
-1
 
SIL level for 
subsea 
pipelines 
SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 1 SIL 0 
Table 7 The PFDavg calculations and SIL levels for two different approaches 
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6. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this thesis was to study the reliability of several subsea equipments in 
order to verify safety integrity level in presence of uncertainty. The appropriate reliability 
targets for safety instrumented functions were carried out in case of SIL verification process. 
This thesis presents two approaches for SIL verification in order to achieve the reliability of 
several subsea equipments. 
The two approaches for SIL verification, the traditional approach and a new approach by 
Abrahamsen, was the introductory focal point of this thesis where the concern was that 
whether a SIS meets the required SIL or not. The traditional approach for SIL verification is 
generally based on the average probability of failure on demand only because it does not 
provide valuable information to decision makers in order to achieve reliability of SIS. In line 
to establish the appropriate verification approach for SIL, in this thesis we argue that to cover 
uncertainty assessment qualitatively in a workshop is more convenient. Therefore, E.B. 
Abrahamsen introduced a new approach for SIL verification.  
This thesis was mainly dealing on how to verify the appropriate reliability targets for safety 
instrumented functions by using the new approach. This approach acknowledges that the 
calculated average probability of failure on demand for a safety function cannot be adequately 
verified only by seeing bond assigned probability number. There was a need to consider the 
important aspects of uncertainty before a conclusion is made on SIL level in that approach.  
Several subsea equipments were taken into account to illustrate both approaches. For both 
approaches, the OREDA database was a reliable data while calculating PFDavg. Several 
calculations have been done in that case in order to decide an appropriate SIL level which 
might be useful for decision makers. But in most of cases for the few subsea equipments 
presented in this thesis, the result could not meet the desired SIL level due to the higher 
failure rate that arises from those equipments, meaning that those equipments were no longer 
acceptable to continue the operation. In this case additional risk reducing measures should be 
implemented prior to the operation. We have observed that there was higher probability of 
failure in that new approach. It is therefore a very important aspect to consider the uncertainty 
factors due to those higher probabilities of failure that arose in our calculations.  
The result from uncertainty analysis should be seen considerably while identifying the 
possible uncertainty factors due to failure of such subsea equipments. Those uncertainty 
factors can be seen thoroughly in the evaluation of uncertainty. This thesis also covered the 
uncertainty evaluations according to MTO perspectives. It was clear that human error, 
technical aspects, operational aspects and work process are the main contributors of any 
particular failure. But this thesis also discussed some other possible factors of uncertainty. 
The decision makers should always consider the uncertainty evaluation in order to reach an 
appropriate decision. It is therefore easier to categorize uncertainty by using uncertainty 
evaluation. 
Therefore, this is an important discussion that is to be considered in the new approach of SIL 
verification in reliability studies. The decision makers can easily come up with an ideal 
solution if there is a possibility to reduce the uncertainty factors. Hereby I can conclude that 
this new approach would be an appropriate analysis for SIL verification which considers the 
important aspects of uncertainty factors. 
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7. Recommendation 
The objectives of this master thesis are to verify safety integrity level for several subsea oil 
and gas equipments, to propose two different approaches of SIL verification, to use reliable 
database such as OREDA database, to propose uncertainty evaluation according to MTO 
perspectives, to propose the reduction of uncertainty factors how to be considered and to 
present appropriate SIL verification approach for decision makers. 
According to the experience from the Norwegian Offshore Industries for SIL analyses, there 
is still some uncertainty in relating to how the IEC standards 61508 and 61511 should be 
implemented. There has been lots of discussion going on about how to determine and verify 
appropriate SIL level. However, there is still need for an appropriate approach to verify SIL 
level.   
The new approach proposed by Abrahamsen will be a good indicator of future development in 
oil and gas industries. It was my immense interest to analyze his approach to this master 
thesis. Most of the oil and gas industries do not consider the uncertainty analyses when 
decision comes to the verification of SIL level because this is still under-developed for the 
reliability engineers. In line with this new approach I started to analyze how to treat 
uncertainty especially in case of SIL verification. My objective was to investigate what are 
those uncertainty factors that are to be considered in the failure of those subsea equipments.    
For the development of future studies we might need appropriate uncertainty model to treat 
uncertainty up to a certain limit for SIL verification in reliability analysis. It is worth to 
mention that we cannot say zero risk or no uncertainty at all can be found in the oil and gas 
operation. There is always risk involved but we can mitigate those risks up to a certain extent. 
In case of equipment failure there might be need of a broad implementation of risk reducing 
measures if the uncertainty factors can be detected properly. Then those subsea equipments 
will be performing reliably so that SIL verification of new approach will be a promising 
approach for the development of oil and gas industry. 
The increasing use of EPCI (Engineering, Procurement, Commissioning and Installation) 
contracts for all service companies in oil and gas industry must need to follow the appropriate 
approach for SIL verification. Especially some service companies, mainly subsea equipments 
supplier, are one of the major players when it comes to supporting the national oil and gas 
operators. Those equipments are required to be verified and defined in order to establish 
reliability targets for safety instrumented functions according to the IEC standards 61508 and 
61511. Therefore, the new approach for SIL verification will be a proper guideline for those 
service companies in line with IEC standards 61508 and 61511. 
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9. Appendices 
I.   A simple reliability block diagram method for SIL verification according to 
IEC 61508 
I.I    Reliability block diagram 
The safety integrity verification for safety related systems to be a important step in safety life 
cycle and PFDavg must be calculated to verify the safety integrity level (SIL). Since IEC 
61508 does not show detailed explanations of the definitions and PFDavg calculations, it is 
quite difficult for reliability engineers to apply the use of standards as guidance. Here we are 
investing different architectures of reliability block diagram.  
Reliability block diagram (RBD) is a graphical analysis technique, which expresses the 
system bas connections of a number of components in accordance with their logical relation 
of reliability. 
 
Figure 16 A RBD example 
 
I.II  Different reliability architectures for calculating PFDavg in both low and high 
demand mode of operation 
For low demand mode of operation: 
Average probability of failure on demand of a safety function for the E/E/PE safety-related 
system is determined by calculating the average prob. Of failure on demand for all the 
subsystems which together include the safety function.  This can be expressed by the 
following: 
PFDSYS = PFDS + PFDL + PFDFE 
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Where 
PFDSYS is the average prob. of failure on demand of a safety function for the E/E/PE safety-
related system; 
PFDS is the average prob. of failure on demand for the sensor subsystem; 
PFDL is the average prob. of failure on demand for the logic subsystem; and 
PFDFE is the average prob. of failure on demand for the final element subsystem. 
 
 
Figure 17 Subsystem structure 
High demand mode of operation: 
PFHSYS = PFHS + PFHL + PFHFE 
Where 
PFHSYS is the average prob. of failure per hour of a safety function for the E/E/PE safety-
related system; 
PFHS is the average prob. of failure per hour for the sensor subsystem; 
PFHL is the average prob. of failure per hour for the logic subsystem; and 
PFHFE is the average prob. of failure per hour for the final element subsystem. 
(IEC 61508-6) 
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I.II.I  1oo1 architecture 
This architecture consists of a single channel, where any potential failure leads to a failure of 
the safety function when a demand establishes.  
 
 
Figure 18 Physical block diagram of 1oo1 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
 
Figure 19 Reliability block diagram of 1oo1 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
Low: 
The dangerous failure for the channel is given by:  
 
Where, ƛDU is the undetected failures, ƛDD is the detected failures and ƛ is the constant failure 
rate. 
The channel equivalent mean down time tCE , adding individual down times for both 
components, tc1 and tc2, in direct proportion to each components probability of failure on 
demand.  
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For a channel with down time tCE resulting from dangerous failures 
 
Therefore, the average probability failure on demand for 1oo1 architecture is 
 
Here are the all terms that we are using for the different reliability architectures:  
 
Abbreviation Term (units) 
T1 Proof test interval (h). For example, 1month (720 h), 6 months (4320 h) 
MTTR Mean time to restoration (h). For example, 8h 
DC Diagnostic coverage. For example, 0%, 90% 
β The fraction of undetected failures that have a common cause 
ΒD Of those failures that are detected by the diagnostic tests, the fraction that have 
a common cause 
ƛ Failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem 
ƛD Dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem, equal to 0.5ƛ 
ƛDD Undetected dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem 
ƛDU Undetected dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem 
ƛSD Detected safe failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem 
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tCE Channel equivalent mean down time (h) for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2 and 2oo3 
architectures 
tGE Voted group equivalent mean down time (h) for 1oo2D architecture 
tCE
‟ 
Channel equivalent mean down time (h) for 1oo2 and 2oo3 architectures 
tGE
‟ 
Voted group equivalent mean down time (h) for 1oo2D architecture 
T2 Interval between demands (h) 
Figure 20 Various terms for different reliability architectures 
 
High: 
 
 
The average probability failure on demand for 1oo1 architecture is 
 
 
I.II.II 1oo2 architecture 
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, such that either channel can 
process the safety function. Therefore, the there might have to be a dangerous failure in both 
channels before a safety function failed on demand. The figure xx shows the 1oo2 
architecture.  
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Figure 21 Physical block diagram of 1oo2 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
 
Figure 22 Reliability block diagram of 1oo2 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
Low: 
 
 
The average probability failure on demand for 1oo2 architecture is 
 
High: 
The average probability failure on demand for 1oo2 architecture is 
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 I.II.III 2oo2 architecture 
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel, so that both channels need to 
demand the safety function before it can start to act. The figure xx shows the architecture of 
2oo2 system. 
 
 
Figure 23 Physical block diagram of 2oo2 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
 
Figure 24 Reliability block diagram of 2oo2 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
Low: 
The average probability failure on demand for 2oo2 architecture is 
 
High: 
The average probability failure on demand for 2oo2 architecture is 
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I.II.IV  1oo2D architecture 
This architecture consists of two channels connected in parallel. During normal operation, 
both channels need to demand the safety function before it can start to act. 
If the diagnostic tests in either channel fail then output are tend to adapt so that overall output 
state then follows by the other channel. If the diagnostic tests find failure from the both 
channels then output goes to the safe state (IEC 61508 - 6). The architecture of 1oo2D can be 
shown in the below in figure xx. 
 
 
Figure 25 Physical block diagram of 1oo2D architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
 
Figure 26 Reliability block diagram of 1oo2D architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
Low: 
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Therefore, the average probability failure on demand for 1oo2D architecture is 
 
 
High: 
The average probability failure on demand for 1oo2D architecture is 
 
 
 I.II.V 2oo3 architecture 
This architecture consists of three channels connected in parallel with a majority selection of 
arrangement for the output signals. In that architecture, the output state is not changed if only 
one channel shows a different result which cannot be identical with other two channels.  The 
following figure xx shows that kind of architecture. 
 
 
Figure 27 Physical block diagram of 2oo3 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
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Figure 28 Reliability block diagram of 2oo3 architecture (IEC 61508-6) 
 
Low: 
The average probability failure on demand for 2oo3 architecture is 
 
 
High: 
The average probability failure on demand for 2oo3 architecture is 
 
 
III. Failure rate 
The life of any item or machine-train can be split into three phases: the early failure (burn-in) 
phase, the useful life phase and the wear-out phase. The following figure xx shows the 
statistical life time of a technical item. The mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) or bathtub curve 
shows that new equipment or a new machine has a higher probability of failure due to 
installation problems, at the beginning of operation. The failure rate function at the beginning 
of operation or in the burn-in phase is quite high, close to constant in useful life phase.  And 
then probability of failure increases sharply with elapsed time. If we assume that the failure 
rate function is constant during useful life phase, this means that the item is not failing during 
this phase. But the failure of that item will start if the item will enters the ear-our phase. 
Therefore, the item should be maintained or replaced before they enter the wear-our phase 
where the wear-out tends to give us very high failure rate.   
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Figure 29 Bathtub shape of the failure rate (OREDA, 2009) 
The failure rates are assumed to be exponentially distributed with parameter ƛ. The failure 
rate function is constant and independent of time, in which case z(t) = ƛ.  
Based on the assumption of an estimated constant failure rate, the mean time to failure, 
MTTF, may be shown as: 
MTTF = 1/ƛ 
The estimate of failure rate ƛ, is defined as the ratio between the observed number of failures, 
n, and the aggregated time in service, τ. 
The maximum likelihood estimator of ƛ is given by: 
= Number of failures / Aggregated time in service = n / τ 
Confidence interval for the failure rate: 
The uncertainty of the estimate failure rate  may be presented as a 90% confidence interval. 
P (ƛL ≤ ƛ < ƛU) = 90% 
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IV. Important features and diagrams of several subsea equipments 
IV.I  Subsea manifold 
 
Figure 30 Typical subsea manifold (Eilib, lecture slide from subsea technology course, UIS, 2011) 
 
Figure 31 Typical subsea manifold interfaces (Eilib, lecture slide from subsea technology course, UIS, 
2011)  
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Figure 32 Subsea manifold and connection systems (GE oil and gas, 2011) 
 
Figure 33 Typical subsea manifolds set up for installation in offshore (GE oil and gas, 2011) 
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IV.II Subsea control systems 
 
Figure 34 Main components of subsea control systems (Eiliv, lecture slide from subsea technology course, 
UIS, 2011)  
 
Figure 35 Picture of typical subsea control systems (Eilib, lecture slide from subsea technology course, 
UIS, 2011)  
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IV.III Subsea control system – SSIV 
Subsea safety isolation valve is generally placed as  close  as  possible  to the  platform  to 
minimise the  riser  inventory  and meet  the  platform  safety  requirements  whilst  avoiding  
potential  interactions  with  existing infrastructure. 
 
Figure 36 A diagram of SSIV for Orlando field (John Girling, 2011) 
 
IV.IV Subsea control system – Xmas tree 
 
Figure 37 Typical subsea Xmas tree (Eilib, lecture slide from subsea technology course, UIS, 2011) xx:  
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Figure 38 Main components of Xmas tree (Eilib, lecture slide from subsea technology course, UIS, 2011) 
 
IV.VI Subsea pipelines 
 
Figure 39 Subsea pipeline installation from offshore platform (Kristin subsea, NTNU) 
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V. Data collected from OREDA database 
V.I  Useful data for subsea manifold 
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V.II Useful data for subsea control system - SSIV 
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V.III Useful data for subsea control system – Xmas tree 
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V.IV Useful data for subsea manifold 
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V.V Useful data for subsea manifold 
 
 
 
Table 8 Probability of explosion or fire with and without an improved PLDC system 
(W. Moore & R. Bea 1993) 
